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1. INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") 1 has been attempting
to ratchet up its enforcement efforts in the last few years.2 While this is
no surprise given the spate of abusive tax shelter transactions peddled by
lawyers and accountants since the late 1990S,3 it should strike a measure
of fear into the heart of the general taxpaying public.4 Not fear driven of
a guilty conscience, but fear that overzealousness on the part of the
Service will be directed at honest taxpayers rather than the intended
targets. In these times of historic government budget deficits,5 taxpayers
should be legitimately concerned that Service employees auditing tax
returns may assert aggressive positions on behalf of the government in
an effort to increase government revenues. Similarly, taxpayers should
be concerned that policymakers at the Service will, in an attempt to
anticipate and foreclose future abusive tax shelters, adopt one-sided
1. In reality, several governmental agencies play a role in administering the federal income
tax system. The Service is a bureau within the Treasury Department and has responsibility for
enforcing the Code and providing general guidance to taxpayers. Nevertheless, the issuance of
regulations, legislative proposals regarding taxation, and certain other policy functions have not
been delegated by the Secretary of the Treasury to the Service and therefore remain the
responsibility of Treasury Department officials outside the Service. Similarly, in certain litigation
contexts, the Tax Division of the Justice Department assumes responsibility for litigating, and
potentially settling, specific tax matters. 28 C.F.R. § 0.70 (2007). The controversy themes
discussed in this article apply equally to all these governmental actors. Consequently, for ease of
discussion they will all be referred to collectively as the "Service" herein.
2. See generally IRS PUB. No. 3744, IRS STRATEGIC PLAN 2005-2009 18-25, available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/strategic-plan-05-09.pdf (emphasizing the need for improved
enforcement); Mark Everson, Closing 'Tax Gap' Is IRS Goal, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 7, 2004,
LEXIS 2004 TNT 68-18, 7 (stating that "we must restore the balance between service and
enforcement"); Mark Everson, Everson Endorses Continued Use of Private Debt Collectors as Tax
Gap Tool, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 20, 2007, LEXIS 2007 TNT 34-206; Mark W. Everson,
Everson Testifies on Tax Shelters at Finance Committee Hearing, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 22,
2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT 204-28, 79 (stating that "the IRS must allocate additional resources to
enforcement"); Kenneth A Gary, Enforcement Remains Priority for LMSB, Nolan Says, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Oct. 19, 2004, LEXIS 2004 TNT 202-2; Kenneth A. Gary, IRS Officials Echo Everson:
Quicken Audit Cycle, Push Enforcement, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 4, 2003, LEXIS 2003 TNT 213-
2.
3. See generally U.S. Department of the Treasury, Treasury White Paper on Corporate Tax
Shelters (pts. I & 2), TAX NOTES TODAY, July 2, 1999, LEXIS 1999 TNT 127-12, 127-13
(discussing tax shelter problem generally).
4. Mark Everson, Everson Endorses Continued Use of Private Debt Collectors as Tax Gap
Tool, TAX NOTES TODAY, Feb. 20, 2007, LEXIS 2007 TNT 34-206, para. I I (noting a 44% increase
in revenues attributable to increased enforcement efforts from 2002 to 2006).
5. Edmund L. Andrews, Bush Plan Would Raise Deficit by $1.2 Trillion, Budget Office Says,
N. Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at A14.
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interpretations of the law favoring the government.
To its credit, the Service's National Taxpayer Advocate Service has
been mindful of past abuses that have occurred under similar
circumstances and has proposed several initiatives to curb overzealous
enforcement actions by Service employees.6 However, these proposals
are limited in their scope and fail to address the threshold question of
what standards should apply in determining whether the Service should
assert a position in a specific enforcement action.7 While a fairly clear
understanding has evolved over time regarding the appropriate standards
that apply to taxpayers in asserting positions on their tax returns, 8 the
state of the law regarding the reciprocal question of what positions
should be asserted by the Service in controversy matters remains
unsettled. 9
The purpose of this article is to examine the considerations that
should influence the development of appropriate controversy position
standards for the Service. In this regard it is crucial to understand the
inherent duality in the Service's role. On one hand it is charged with
enforcing the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code"), and as a result it
attempts to maximize the collection of all legally owed taxes. On the
other, the Service is charged with maintaining the efficient and fair
operation of the tax system as a whole. The United States federal
income tax system is premised on voluntary taxpayer compliance with
the Code.' 0 Taxpayer compliance is linked to perceptions regarding the
overall fairness of the tax system.11 When taxpayers perceive the
Service as overreaching, they lose faith in the system and voluntary
6. Nina E. Olsen, Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate, National Taxpayer Advocate Issues Report on
Fiscal 2005 Objectives, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 30, 2004, LEXIS 2004 TNT 128-21.
7. Id.
8. See discussion infra Part iI.A.
9. See discussion infra Part lI.B.
10. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 815-16 (1984) ("Our complex and
comprehensive system of federal taxation, relying as it does upon self-assessment and reporting,
demands that all taxpayers be forthright in the disclosure of relevant information to the taxing
authorities. Without such disclosure, and the concomitant power of the Government to compel
disclosure, our national tax burden would not be fairly and equitably distributed."); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973) (describing system as one "where obligations of disclosure exist
and under a system largely dependent upon honest self-reporting even to survive"); Treas. Reg. §
1.461-1(a)(3) (as amended in 1999) ("Each year's return should be complete in itself, and taxpayers
shall ascertain the facts necessary to make a correct return."). While not technically accurate, the
U.S. approach of having taxpayers shoulder the initial burden of determining and paying their tax
liability is generally referred to as a "self-assessment" system.
11. LILLIAN DORIS, THE AMERICAN WAY IN TAXATION: INTERNAL REVENUE, 1862-1963, at
1-2 (1963) (noting that self-assessment system is threatened if public loses confidence that tax laws
are operating fairly).
2008]
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compliance is harmed. 12 For instance, when the Service publishes one-
sided guidance it undercuts its important taxpayer education efforts
because taxpayers "learn" that the tax law will be interpreted in a biased
manner. To avoid these pitfalls, it is necessary for the Service to strike
an appropriate balance in taking positions to mitigate the tensions
inherent in its dual role of facilitating voluntary compliance and policing
against non-compliance.
Part II of this article reviews the current position standards that
apply to taxpayers and the Service. Part III examines the key
considerations which should be taken into account in developing
controversy position standards for the Service. Part IV makes an initial
attempt at developing a set of controversy guidelines for the Service and
analyzes some possible critiques of the proposed guidelines. Part V
concludes that in order to protect the integrity of the self-assessment tax
system the Service must articulate clear and administrable position
standards for use by Service employees that take a balanced view of the
tax law and prevent overreaching by the government.
II. EXISTING POSITION STANDARDS FOR TAXPAYERS AND THE
GOVERNMENT
A. Taxpayer Position Standards
Under the Code, it is the responsibility of each taxpayer to
determine how the Code applies to her situation and then report and
remit the tax owed to the government.' 3  While the Service has the
power to check compliance by auditing taxpayers, in reality only a tiny
fraction of filed returns are audited.' 4  Consequently, the tax system
12. Id.; Douglas A. Kahn, Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To
Tax or Not to Tax?, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 327, 351-52 (1994) ("Our self-assessment system of taxation
relies on a willingness of the populace to report honestly to the government, and that willingness
rests on a popular belief that the government's system of taxation is fair."); Robert J. Peroni, A
Policy Critique of the Section 469 Passive Loss Rules, 62 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (1988) ("[T]ax
shelters destroy the horizontal and vertical equity of the tax system and lead average taxpayers to
feel that they are fools for paying their fair shares of the income tax burden, thereby undermining
the foundation of the self-assessment system.").
13. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(3) (as amended in 1999) ("Each year's return should be complete
in itself, and taxpayers shall ascertain the facts necessary to make a correct return."). See also
I.R.C. § 6065 (2007) (requiring returns to be signed under penalty of perjury); Valverde v. Comm'r,
53 T.C.M. (CCH) 628, 629 (1987) (taxpayer has obligation to file correct return); Wiseley v.
Comm'r, 13 T.C. 253, 256 (1949) (taxpayer must file correct returns), rev'd on other grounds, 185
F.2d 263 (6th Cir. 1950).
14. The Service currently audits less than 0.6 percent of all income tax returns. Pamela J.
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relies heavily on taxpayers correctly reporting their tax burden in the
first instance. Preparing tax returns requires taxpayers to understand the
relevant provisions of the Code and apply them to their particular factual
circumstances. Every tax return thus requires legal judgments regarding
both the meaning of the Code and its application to specific situations.
In most cases, the interpretation of the law will be well-settled and
easily applied by the taxpayer, but in others the law or its application
will be open to varying interpretations. In these cases, what standard
should the taxpayer use in determining whether his position is
appropriate? While no single authoritative statement of the relevant
standards for taxpayer return positions exists, a set of fairly well
accepted return position standards has evolved over time. These
standards find their sources in the ethics codes and opinions issued by
professional organizations,15 the Service regulations governing practice
before the Service, 16 and the various penalty provisions of the Code and
regulations. 17
What emerges from these various sources is a baseline standard that
a taxpayer must have a "realistic possibility of success" for his position
in order to file his tax return on that basis without specifically disclosing
the position to the Service.1 8  While using percentages to define the
strength of a legal position is always fraught with some peril,19 the
Gardiner, TIGTA Reviews IRS's 'Falling' Examination Rate, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 25, 2002,
LEXIS 2002 TNT 123-23, 2. Even audits of large corporate taxpayers declined "significantly"
between 1997 and 2002. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION
RELATING TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE AS REQUIRED BY THE IRS REFORM AND
RESTRUCTURING ACT OF 1998 at 36 (JCX-53-03 2003), available at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-53-
03.pdf.
15. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985) (realistic
possibility of success standard); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'lI Responsibility, Formal Op. 346
(Revised) (1982) (tax shelter opinion rules); ABA Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965)
(reasonable basis standard).
16. 31 C.F.R. § 10 (2007) (generally referred to as Circular 230).
17. I.R.C. § 6662 (2007) (accuracy related penalty); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b) (as amended in
2003) (negligence, reasonable basis, and realistic possibility of success); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-
4(d), 1.6662-4(g) (as amended in 2003) (substantial authority and more likely than not); I.R.C. §§
6664(c), 6664(d) (2007) (reasonable cause exceptions); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (as amended in
2003) (reasonable cause exceptions); Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b) (as amended in 1992) (realistic
possibility of success).
18. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(1) (as amended in 2003); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2007); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
19. A legal opinion essentially represents an educated guess by a practitioner regarding the
likelihood that a court will rule in a certain matter based on all the relevant facts and legal
authorities. As such, quantifying such a judgment in precise mathematical percentages is counter-
intuitive at best and a fool's errand at worst. While historically tax practitioners were reluctant to
undertake such quantifications of their opinions, most tax practitioners now routinely use such
percentages in describing their assessments. Jasper L. Cummings, Jr., The Range of Legal Tax
20081
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realistic possibility of success standard is generally defined as a one in
three chance of success on the merits if the position is litigated.2° Still,
no single standard can cover all the situations a taxpayer may face.
Consequently, this general standard is subject to modification based on
the particular situation involved. Thus, the accepted standards provide
that a return position having a "reasonable basis" can be taken on a tax
return without penalty as long as it is adequately disclosed to the
Service, 21 but negligent or frivolous positions are inappropriate for an
initial tax return and are subject to penalty even if disclosed.22 In terms
of probability percentages, a position is typically thought to have a
reasonable basis if it has a greater than 20% chance of success on the
merits.23 In this scheme, a frivolous position would be one with a less
than ten percent chance of success.24
Conversely, sometimes the Code specifically imposes higher
reporting position standards than the realistic possibility of success
norm. For instance, penalties for certain large understatements of
income can be imposed for non-disclosed positions if the position lacks
"substantial authority., 25  If a tax shelter transaction is involved,
taxpayers must reasonably believe that they have a "more likely than
not" chance of success, even if they adequately disclose the transaction
to the Service. 6 Using percentage probability benchmarks again,
"substantial authority" is thought to represent approximately a 40
percent chance of success on the merits27 and the "more likely than not"
Opinions, with Emphasis on the 'Should' Opinion," 98 TAX NOTES 1125 (2003); Detlev F. Vagts,
Legal Opinions in Quantitative Terms: The Lawyer as Haruspex or Bookie?, 34 BUS. LAW. 421
(1979). See generally Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Taxation Comm. on the Standards of Tax Practice,
Standards of Tax Practice Statement, 54 TAX LAW. 185 (2000); Frank J. Gould, Giving Tax Advice
- Some Ethical, Professional, and Legal Considerations, 97 TAX NOTES 523 (2002).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b) (as amended in 1992); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2007).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c) (as amended in 2003).
22. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-3(a), 1.6662-3(b) (as amended in 2003). For these purposes a
position is never negligent if it meets the reasonable basis standard. Id.
23. Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Painting the Accounting Practitioner into a Tax
Practice Corner, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sep. 15, 2005, LEXIS 2005 TNT 178-4.
24. Id.; Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, 'Reasonable Basis' v. Other Tax Opinion
Standards, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 9, 1996, LEXIS 96 TNT 237-28; Bernard Wolfman, James P.
Holden & Deborah H. Schenk, ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE 42 (3d ed. 1995).
25. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4(a), 1.6662-4(d) (as amended in 2003).
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(g) (as amended in 2003).
27. The relevant regulations define substantial authority as a position that is stronger than a
mere realistic possibility of success (i.e., 33%) but less than more likely than not (50%). Treas.
Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(2) (as amended in 2003). See also Sheldon 1. Banoff & Harvey L. Coustan,
Final Regulations on Return Preparers' Penalties: IRS Refuses to Deal, Preparers' Fears Prove to
Be Real/Penalty Roulette - Roll the Wheel/Who Knows How the Courts Will Feel?, 70 TAXES 137,
159 (1992) (suggesting 35-40%); Raby & Raby, supra note 23 (suggesting 35-40%).
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28standard represents a greater than 50 percent chance of success.
Finally, even if a taxpayer fails to adhere to the relevant position
standard, penalties can generally be avoided if the position is taken in
good faith and the failure is attributable to reasonable cause.29
These taxpayer reporting standards are driven in significant part by
a weighing of competing interests. On the one hand, taxes are forced
impositions by the government on its citizens and therefore taxpayers
should have the legal right to challenge their obligation to pay such
impositions even if they only have a small chance of success. On the
other hand, the inability of the Service to fully and systemically audit
individual taxpayer compliance while maintaining a functional tax
system necessitates that taxpayers be required to report their income and
taxes owed fairly and correctly in the first instance.
The baseline realistic possibility of success standard strikes a
balance that is tilted somewhat in the taxpayer's favor. The government
can have a two-thirds chance of being correct and yet the taxpayer can
generally take the opposite position on her tax return without specifically
highlighting the item for the Service. 30  Further, even more aggressive
positions (e.g., ones where the government would be expected to win 75-
80% of the time) can be taken if adequately disclosed on the tax return.31
These taxpayer leaning standards are generally justified by viewing the
32Service in the traditional role of an adversarial party in litigation. The
Service has generally accepted these pro-taxpayer reporting standards
and only sought statutory adjustment to them for situations it found
particularly troubling to effective tax administration (e.g., by requiring
substantial authority to exist for positions resulting in large income
28. Indeed, in drafting written opinions for clients, tax attorneys typically further refine the
relative strength of positions meeting the "more likely than not" standard by stating their legal
conclusions in terms of "should" (sometimes further refined as "weak" and "strong" shoulds) and
"will." Marvin A. Chirelstein & Lawrence A. Zelenak, Tax Shelters and the Search for a Silver
Bullet, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1939, 1941 n.5 (2005); Cummings, supra note 19. These terms
roughly equate to increments of certainty reciprocal to the standards for certainties below 50%. See,
e.g., New Regs., Merrill Lynch Settlement Highlight Tax Shelter News, 95 J. TAX'N 254, 254 (2001);
Michael L. Schler, Ten More Truths About Tax Shelters, 55 TAx L. REV. 325, 353 (2002). Thus,
"should" opinions are often viewed as representing a 60%, 67%, or 80% chance of success on the
merits depending on their qualification as weak, normal or strong, and a "will" opinion represents a
more than 90% probability of success.
29. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (as amended in 2003).
30. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
31. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
32. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985); ABA
Comm. on Prof l Ethics, Formal Op. 314 (1965). See also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Raising the Ethical
Bar for Tax Lawyers: Why We Need Circular 230, 111 TAX NOTES 823 (2006).
2008]
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omissions and by mandating that a more likely than not standard be
applied to certain tax shelter transactions).33
On the other hand, the current standards are not completely pro-
taxpayer. A taxpayer generally can challenge a law in court as long as
her position is not frivolous.34 However, under the currently accepted
tax return reporting standards, a non-frivolous position is only permitted
without penalty if it has a realistic possibility of success or the position
is disclosed and has a reasonable basis. 35 Thus, a gap exists where a
position could be litigated in court, but could not be initially asserted on
the taxpayer's tax return without incurring potential penalties. This is
not an unfair elimination of a taxpayer's right to maintain such a position
and challenge the law since, while the taxpayer cannot take the position
on an initial tax return, he could pay the tax and file a refund claim
asserting the non-frivolous position.36 If the Service rejects the claim,
then the taxpayer could pursue the matter in court. 3  Refusing to allow
taxpayers to take such positions on their initial tax returns is a means of
bolstering the efficient operation of the self-assessment system and
ensuring that very extreme taxpayer positions are only raised in
situations where the Service has been made fully aware of the positions
and can prepare to litigate the matter in a clear adversarial context.38
B. Government Position Standards
While a generally accepted set of position standards exist for
taxpayer return positions, the same cannot be said for Service
positions. 39 The primary guidance on the relevant controversy standards
for the Service is contained in Revenue Procedure 64-22.4o In relevant
part the procedure provides that:
At the heart of [tax] administration is interpretation of the Code. It is
the responsibility of each person in the Service, charged with the duty
of interpreting the law, to try to find the true meaning of the statutory
provision and not to adopt a strained construction in the belief that he
33. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.6662-4(a), 1.6662-4(d), 1.6662-4(g) (as amended in 2003).
34. I.R.C. § 6673 (2007) (providing penalties or court costs where taxpayer's position in
litigation determined to be frivolous); T.C. R. 33; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1
(2002).
35. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(1) (as amended in 2003); 31 C.F.R. § 10.34 (2007); ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985).
36. See, e.g., Yuen v. United States, 825 F.2d 244, 245 (9th Cir. 1987).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. Wolfman, Holden & Schenk, supra note 24, at 332-34.
40. Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689.
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is 'protecting the revenue.' The revenue is properly protected only
when we ascertain and apply the true meaning of the statute.
The Service also has the responsibility of applying and administering
the law in a reasonable, practical manner. Issues should only be raised
by examining officers when they have merit, never arbitrarily or for
trading purposes. At the same time, the examining officer should never
hesitate to raise a meritorious issue.4 1
This statement recognizes that the primary function of the Service
is to ensure the efficient functioning of the tax system but that this goal
is best served by interpreting and applying the law in a fair and balanced
manner.42 The Service's key role in facilitating the operation of the self-
assessment system is further stressed in the Service's own statement of
its mission, which is to "[p]rovide America's taxpayers top quality
service by helping them understand and meet their tax responsibilities
and by applying the tax law with integrity and fairness to all."' 3
Taking these announced standards at face value, one would expect
the Service to eschew extreme interpretations of the tax laws and only
raise issues on audit that the Service believes embody the "correct"
interpretation of the relevant Code provisions.44  However, the actual
application of the Service's own standards is quite mixed. Regarding
interpretive matters, practitioners frequently maintain that the Service
41. Id.
42. Internal Revenue Service, IRS Releases 'Oral History Interview' of Former Commissioner
Caplin, TAX NOTES TODAY, June 22, 1994, LEXIS 94 TNT 120-25, para. 36 [hereinafter Caplin
Interview].
43. Internal Revenue Service, The Agency, Its Mission and Statutory Authority,
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=98141,00.html (last visited Sep. 1, 2007). See also I.R.M.
8.1.1.4 (2003) ("The mission of the service is to encourage and achieve the highest possible degree
of voluntary compliance with the tax laws and regulations and to conduct itself so as to warrant the
highest degree of public confidence in its integrity and efficiency.").
44. However, it is worth noting that prior to 1998 the Service's mission statement included a
specific acknowledgement that the role of the Service was limited to collecting the "correct" tax.
This language was dropped in 1998 when the Service amended its mission statement in response to
the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, § 1002, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685
(directing the Service to "review and restate its mission to place a greater emphasis on serving the
public and meeting taxpayers' needs"). Prior to 1998 the mission statement read: "The purpose of
the Internal Revenue Service is to collect the proper amount of tax at the least cost; serve the public
by continually improving the quality of our products and services; and perform in a manner
warranting the highest degree of public confidence in our integrity, efficiency and fairness."
Internal Revenue Service, Full Text: Revised IRS Policy Statement on Privacy, TAX NOTES TODAY,
Mar. 18, 1994, LEXIS 94 TNT 53-47. Some commentators believe the omission of the "proper tax"
concept signals a paradigm shift in the Service's approach to controversy matters. E.g., Bryan T.
Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial Paradigm Shift in the IRS
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 78-86 (2004).
2008)
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has engaged in over-reaching when providing guidance on the Code's
meaning. At the audit level, the Service specifically instructs its
examining agents to raise all meritorious issues, even if the agent
actually believes the taxpayer's legal position is the correct one.45
Additionally, an agent is prohibited from raising an issue based on a
"strained construction" of a statute.46 The juxtaposition of these
standards may lead some agents to conclude that any position has
"merit" and must be raised as long as it is not based on a "strained
construction;" thereby creating a very low threshold for raising issues.47
A government slanted audit approach is arguably justified based on
the functional division of authority within the Service. The role of
examining agents is generally limited to issue spotting and fact finding,
while the authority to weigh the merit of legal issues and settle cases is
housed within the Service's Appeals Office. 8 However, while Appeals
Officers weigh the legal merits of the issues presented to them, their
primary function is to settle cases.49 Unlike a court decision (where the
law's application is typically resolved on an all or nothing basis in favor
of one party), Appeals settlements often involve splitting the issue on a
percentage basis. 50 Thus, if the Service has a 30% chance of winning it
might attempt to settle the dispute for 30 cents per dollar of tax involved.
A taxpayer might be willing to accept this settlement (even though he
expects that a court would rule completely in his favor) based on the
30% risk of losing in court and the costs in time and money of defending
his position.5  Thus, by asserting aggressive positions at the
45. Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689; Caplin Interview, supra note 42, at 52; Frederic G.
Cornel, The Service and the Private Practitioner: Face to Face and Hand in Hand - a Private
Practitioner's View, II AM. J. TAX POL'Y 343, 359-60 (1994).
46. Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689; I.R.M. 31.1.1.1 (2004); I.R.M. 32.2.1.1 (2004);
I.R.M. 33.2.2.2.3 (2004).
47. Comeel, supra note 45, at 359-60; Joint Committee on Taxation, JCT Interest and Penalty
Study (pt. 1), TAX NOTES TODAY, July 27, 1999, LEXIS 1999 TNT 143-33, para. 477.
48. I.R.M. 8.1.1.1 (2003); I.R.M. 8.1.1.3 (2006).
49. I.R.M. 8.1.1.1 (2003); I.R.M. 8.1.1.3 (2006).
50. George Guttman, News Analysis: IRS Averages: Winning Little, Losing Big, 61 TAX
NOTES 155, 156 (1993) ("Unless there is an IRS policy to the contrary, the hearing officer in the
appeals office makes a settlement offer on the basis of the quality of the case sent up by the auditor
and the hazards of litigation. For example, if the officer thinks that the IRS has only a 30-percent
chance of succeeding in litigation, an offer will be made to settle the case for 30 cents on the
dollar."). Still, there are limits on the Appeals officer's settlement authority. For instance, Appeals
officers generally refuse to settle any issue on a percentage basis where they believe the taxpayer
has less than a 20% chance of success on the merits. The goal of this rule is to dissuade nuisance
settlements. L. HART WRIGHT, NEEDED CHANGES IN INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE CONFLICT
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES 12 (1970).
51. Corneel, supra note 45, at 359-60.
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examination level, the government is essentially able to extort payments
from taxpayers whose positions are most likely the correct view of the
law. This seems counter to the Service's stated goal of trying "to find
the true meaning of the statutory provision., 52 By pushing one-sided
positions the Service harms its own credibility with taxpayers and
confirms taxpayer beliefs that the Service interprets the laws unfairly.
Where legal issues predominate, what should be the appropriate
standard to apply in deciding whether the Service should pursue an issue
in a controversy matter? The current standards are unclear. At a 1993
conference where this issue was discussed, one Service panelist,
speaking for himself, stated that he felt the Service should have "a
reasonable basis ... to believe that we have a chance of prevailing" and
"should feel reasonably confident that the position is correct., 53  If
"reasonable basis" is interpreted to indicate the same standard used for
taxpayer positions, then this panelist's statement seems to equate
roughly a 20% chance of success on the merits coupled with a good faith
belief that the position is nevertheless correct.54 However, the panelist
went on to state, "I don't think we have to have better than 50
percent.... We have to feel we have a pretty good shot at winning.1
55
In light of this comment the report of the conference took the position
that the standard being advocated by this panelist was "probably
equivalent" to the "realistic possibility of success" standard (i.e., 33%)
applicable to taxpayer return positions.56 In any event, despite this
panelist's attempt at formulating a standard for the Service, no
consensus was reached at the conference regarding the appropriate
standard.57
III. CONSIDERATIONS IN DETERMINING APPROPRIATE CONTROVERSY
POSITION STANDARDS
The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the Service's
controversy position standards are ill-defined at best. The lack of
justifiable standards for the Service promotes taxpayer disrespect for the
tax law and permits unwarranted overreaching by the Service. However,
the consideration of more appropriate government position standards
52. Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689.
53. Michael Mulroney, Report on the Invitational Conference on Professionalism in Tax
Practice, Washington, D.C. October 1993, 11 Am. J. TAX POL'Y 369, 388 (1994).
54. See discussion supra Part IIA.
55. Mulroney, supra note 53, at 389.
56. Id. at 396.
57. Id. at 396-97; Wolfman, Holden & Schenk, supra note 24, at 332-34.
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first requires an understanding of the competing considerations that must
be balanced to ensure that the Service is sufficiently dissuaded from
taking one-sided positions while still retaining an effective ability to
police the self-assessment system. This section highlights several of the
key considerations.
A. Promoting Compliance through Fair and Equal Government
Positions
In developing controversy position standards for the government, it
is important to always keep in mind the nature of the self-assessment tax
system and the Service's delicate role as the guardian of that system.
58
Under the self-assessment system, taxpayers must interpret the tax laws
themselves and properly apply that law to their own situation.59 For the
system to work efficiently, taxpayers must be able to understand the law
and be willing to comply with it.
60
The Service plays a key role in fostering both taxpayer
understanding and compliance. By issuing interpretive guidance
regarding the law's meaning, the Service sets the stage for taxpayer
understanding. It also creates a possible dynamic for taxpayer
frustration. No one relishes paying taxes, but if the laws are perceived
as fair, then the burden is less onerous. Conversely, if taxpayers read
Service guidance as being slanted in the government's favor, they lose
respect for the law and are less likely to obey it.6  To promote
compliance, the Service must interpret the law in a manner that
taxpayers perceive as just and equitable.62 Indeed, the Service must be
especially vigilant in being evenhanded in its interpretations since it is
the perception that matters as much as the reality. As with any battle of
perceptions, it is often the case that a lifetime of good can be tarnished
with even one misstep. Even a few notable instances of Service
overreaching are likely to taint the perceptions of taxpayers and tax
practitioners and cause them to overlook the majority of instances where
the Service's interpretations are fully in line with a balanced view of the
law.
The Service is also charged with preventing taxpayer abuse of the
system. As a result, it must audit taxpayers to spot check compliance.
58. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
59. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
60. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
61. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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The most obvious consequence of an audit is the assertion of a tax
deficiency which, if upheld, directly increases the government's tax
receipts. However, the more significant role of the audit process is to
help maintain the integrity of the self-assessment tax system. The
possibility of an audit dissuades taxpayers from taking unwarranted
return positions.63 It also provides taxpayers with assurances that the
Service is making sure that others are complying with the law and the
tax burden is being fairly shared. Thus, while no one relishes the
prospect of being audited, it is reassuring to know that the Service is
doing its job.
The benefits of audits for the tax system, however, can also be
turned into a detriment to compliance if the Service is too heavy handed
and one sided in pursing them. Again, perceptions matter. If taxpayers
feel they are being dealt with unfairly, then their discontent is likely to
spread to others and ultimately impair faith in the self-assessment system
throughout society. For instance, when examining agents assert
aggressive positions, taxpayers are forced to spend time and money
defending positions that are most likely correct or settling the case to
avoid incurring these expenses. Such situations may promote the
perception that the Service uses its enforcement powers unfairly to exact
improper amounts of tax. Consequently, while the Service needs to
enforce the tax laws, its enforcement efforts can become
counterproductive if they leave the taxpaying public with the impression
that the Service is a Goliath trying to bully them into submission.
B. Defining the Law to be Applied
A key goal of the Service is to find the "true meaning" of the tax
laws and help taxpayers "understand ... their tax responsibilities. 64
While this is an important goal, it subsumes several important questions.
In particular, what method of statutory interpretation should the Service
use in finding the true meaning of the law and how should the Service
exercise any discretion it has in interpreting such true meaning?
Reasonable minds can differ regarding methods of statutory
interpretation. Indeed, the debate regarding the proper approach for
interpreting statutes is a perennial one in American jurisprudence.65 The
63. I.R.M. 1.2.1.4.10 P4-21 (1974) ("The primary objective in selecting returns for
examination is to promote the highest degree of voluntary compliance on the part of taxpayers.");
Byron L. Dorgan, Narrowing the $100 Billion Tax Gap, 37 TAX NOTES 925, 927 (1987) (discussing
the relationship between increased IRS funding and increased compliance).
64. Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689.
65. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); Antonin Scalia,
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purpose of this article is not to undertake yet another rehashing of this
debate in the tax arena.6 6 Rather, at this juncture it is merely important
to highlight that one's views regarding the statutory interpretation issue
will have an impact on determining the appropriate controversy position
standards applicable to the Service.
For instance, if the law is to be interpreted using a form of strict
statutory construction focusing closely on the literal text of the statute,
then the Service should adhere closely to the statute's plain meaning in
determining which issues to raise when auditing a tax return. Under
such an approach, the Service arguably should only raise issues that are
very clearly incorrect under the literal language of the statute. At the
other extreme, the Service might take the position that it is free to
interpret the relevant statutes broadly to implement the Service's
interpretation of the law's purpose and the requirements of some over-
arching concept of good tax policy. In that case, the Service would seem
remiss in not asserting positions that would further the Service's view of
good tax policy, even if there is a substantial chance that a court would
refuse to interpret the statutory language in that manner.
In Revenue Procedure 64-22, the Service gives an indication of its
traditional approach by noting that the role of determining tax policy
resides with the Congress and that the Service must carry out that policy
by determining "the reasonable meaning of various Code provisions in
light of the Congressional purpose in enacting them., 67 While Revenue
Procedure 64-22 is still in force, one might question whether its focus on
Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in a
Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 3, 17 (Amy Gutmann
ed., 1997); Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15
CARDOZO L. REv. 601, 622 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135
U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1479 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 321 (1990); L. L. Fuller, American
Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REV. 429 (1934); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the
Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (2001); William D. Popkin, Law-Making Responsibility and
Statutory Interpretation, 68 IND. L.J. 865, 865 (1993); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1186-87 (1989).
66. See, e.g., Mary L. Heen, Plain Meaning, the Tax Code and Doctrinal Incoherence, 48
HASTINGS L.J. 771, 771 (1997); Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, "'Purposivism, " and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAx L. REv. 677, 677-78 (1996); William D. Popkin, An
"Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia 's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1133,
1181 (1992); Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue
Code, 64 N.C. L. REv. 623, 623 (1986). However, the proposed controversy guidelines presented in
Part IV infra are premised in part on the view that the Service should be given a significant role in
tax policy and administration matters and therefore should be free to employ a broad array of
authorities beyond the literal text of a statutory provision in making such determinations.
67. Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689.
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Congressional purpose continues to represent the actual position of the
Service. In the forty years since the Revenue Procedure was written
there has been a resurgence in strict textual modes of statutory
interpretation in the federal courts. Further, since the mid-1980s when
Justice Scalia joined the Supreme Court, the appropriateness of using
Congressional reports and other legislative history to inform the
meaning of statutes has been frequently criticized.68 Consequently,
despite the language of Revenue Procedure 64-22, the proper mode of
statutory interpretation that should be employed by the Service is likely
still open for debate.
However, even if the recent evolution of statutory interpretation
theory would imply a reduced role for the Service in interpreting the
meaning of the tax laws, several other factors cut in the other direction.
Most notably, the Service is a creature of the executive branch rather
than a court. As such, it is charged by the legislative branch with
implementing the laws and therefore should have a freer hand in
determining the meaning of a law. Congress itself often drafts tax
legislation with the explicit intention that the Service will issue
legislative regulations to implement a generalized statutory provision or
extend a specific provision into an analogous area. 69  Even in areas
where Congress has not given explicit authority to the Service to issue
legislative regulations, the inherent complexity of the tax laws and the
daunting task of applying them to the myriad of economic activity in the
country mean that as a practical matter the Service will often need to
apply statutory language in situations unforeseen by the drafters of that
legislation. In recognition of this reality, the Supreme Court has been
increasing the deference given to administrative interpretations of
statutory language despite its general movement toward strict textual
rules of statutory interpretation. 70  Given the high degree of judicial
68. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623
(1990); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q.
351, 355 (1994); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in
Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV.
277 (1990).
69. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 351(g)(4) (2006); 26 U.S.C. § 1275(d) (2006); 26 U.S.C. §
5041(c)(7) (2006); 26 U.S.C. §§ 6049(c)(2)(b), 6049(d)(8)(c) (2006).
70. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) ("We hold that
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference
when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise
of that authority. Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an
agency's power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some other
indication of a comparable congressional intent."); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
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deference to administrative interpretations and the difficulty faced by
Congress in drafting tax legislation that adequately anticipates all
situations, it seems incumbent on the Service to be deliberate in its
interpretation and application of the tax laws to ensure that it arrives at
fair and balanced positions that mesh with sound tax policy.7'
C. Addressing Institutional Realities
While weighing the strength of a particular tax position is often a
perplexing endeavor,72 the task is made even more complex when it
must be accomplished in the context of a large organization. Unlike a
taxpayer, who needs to be concerned only with the appropriateness of a
position in the context of their particular situation, the Service must also
consider how asserting a position in a particular controversy affects its
overall tax enforcement and administration efforts. Consequently, in
order to promote voluntary compliance with the tax laws, the Service
may need to forego pursing an issue in a particular controversy (even if
there is a real likelihood that the Service would be successful if it
litigated the issue) to further overall tax administration goals. However,
the Service is an institution composed of thousands of employees
scattered geographically across the country and interacting with
taxpayers on a daily basis. Consequently, the Service must develop
internal procedures and practices to ensure that its employees are making
such determinations in a uniform and fair manner that appropriately
balances the institution's tax administration concerns against the factual
equities inherent in particular cases.73
A crucial element in creating an institutional environment that
produces the desired uniform and balanced results is the adoption of a
comprehensive set of position guidelines applicable to the entire
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). This type of broad judicial deference based on an inferred
Congressional delegation of authority should logically apply to most Service interpretations of the
Code. See Kristen E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial
Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1538 (2006).
71. See, e.g., Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 731, 758 (2002) (expressing concerns about Service anti-taxpayer bias); Irving
Salem et al., Am. Bar Ass'n Section of Taxation Task Force on Judicial Deference, ABA Section on
Taxation Report of the Task Force on Judicial Deference, 57 TAX LAW. 717, 724-25 (2004)
(questioning Service's motives and willingness to push statutory boundaries).
72. See supra note 19.
73. The Service has already issued a great volume of directives to guide employees regarding
various operating procedures and internal policies. Such directives are compiled in the voluminous,
if poorly organized, Internal Revenue Manual (I.R.M.). As discussed infra at Part IV.C., the
purpose of this article is not to replace such practical guidance but to add to it a set of guiding
principles to serve as a general framework for Service employees involved in controversy matters.
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institution so that all employees are aware of the institution's overall
goals. 74 This permits employees to place their own particular roles in
context and assists them in monitoring their phase of the controversy
process to ensure that their actions are in fact furthering the institution's
interests. Unfortunately, the Service's current controversy guidelines are
in disarray.75
Once the institution's overall goals are defined and announced, the
relevant guidelines must be further refined to fit the various roles and
skill sets of particular types of employees. The review of a tax return
can produce a variety of potential issues ranging from simple
mathematical errors or information matching discrepancies to nuanced
judgments regarding the proper taxation of complex structured financial
transactions. It makes institutional sense to conserve resources by
allocating various tasks in the review process to different employees
based on their expertise, knowledge, and authority. Today, returns are
initially reviewed by sophisticated computer programs to identify and
resolve run of the mill errors and to assist in selecting returns that should
be subjected to a more comprehensive audits.76 Examining agents are
then assigned based on their knowledge and expertise in light of the
estimated complexity of the audit.77
However, once a competent agent is assigned to review a tax return,
what rules should govern the agent's decisions regarding the issues
raised? Should the agent be charged with appraising the systemic policy
concerns implicated by a particular issue or should that task be reserved
74. However, merely announcing a set of standards by itself may be of little use without
sufficient internal trainings on the guidelines and a demonstrated commitment to the new guidelines
at the highest levels of the Service. In this regard a number of studies have indicated that employee
compliance with announced ethical codes of conduct increases dramatically if employees perceive
that management believes in, and is in fact adhering to, the announced policies. See, e.g., LINDA
KLEBE TREVIF4O & GARY R. WEAVER, MANAGING ETHICS IN BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: SOCIAL
SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVES 117-18, 141 (2003); Linda Klebe Trevino et al., Managing Ethics and
Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL. MGMT. REV. 131, 142 (1999); Gary R.
Weaver et al., Corporate Ethics Programs as Control Systems: Influences of Executive
Commitment and Environmental Factors, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 41, 41 (1999); Gary R. Weaver et al.,
Integrated and Decoupled Corporate Social Performance: Management Commitments, External
Pressures, and Corporate Ethics Practices, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 539, 539 (1999).
75. See discussion supra Part lI.B.
76. For a detailed discussion of the means by which tax returns are screened by the Service
and selected for further review, see MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8.03
(2d ed., rev 2003).
77. I.R.M. 4.19.1.2.3 (2001) (explaining how returns selected for further review are allocated
among different categories of examining agents based "upon the complexity of issues involved, the
degree of accounting and auditing skills required to perform the examination, and whether it can be
effectively done by correspondence").
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for some subsequent internal review? Even with respect to determining
whether an issue should be raised on the basis of the particular
taxpayer's situation, should the examining agent be permitted to resolve
the merits of a nuanced legal issue that, despite her experience as an
auditor, she may be ill-equipped to evaluate? 78 Phrased more directly,
what limits in applying the Service's announced controversy position
guidelines should be applied to examining agents?
The traditional standard that the Service has applied in this context
is that examining agents are supposed to raise all meritorious issues
presented by a tax return and are prohibited from settling or
compromising the issues identified. 79 To this end, examining agents are
provided with guidelines for performing their audits, including advice
regarding issues that may be present for particular types of taxpayers.8 °
They also have the ability to request guidance from the Service's
National Office regarding the appropriateness of raising a particular
issue. But, primary authority to settle issues identified by an examining
agent is vested in the Service's Appeals Division.8' Consequently, the
paradigm is for an examining agent to gather the relevant facts and raise
the issues presented by a tax return and for an Appeals agent to weigh
the legal merits and attempt to compromise the contested issues after
taking into account the hazards of litigation. In fulfilling this role the
Appeals Division will often consult with attorneys in the Service's
Office of Chief Counsel.
Despite this dogma, which suggests that examining agents have
little discretion in whether issues are raised, the reality has always been
quite different.82  In the first instance, if an examining agent can be
78. While the Service's examining agents dealing with complex cases are typically quite
experienced, most are not attorneys.
79. Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964-1 C.B. 689; I.R.M. 4.10.7.5.3.1 (2006) ("Examination personnel
have the authority and responsibility to reach a definite conclusion based on a balanced and
impartial evaluation of all the evidence.... This authority does not extend to consideration of the
hazards of litigation.").
80. Much of this guidance is contained in the Internal Revenue Manual, which contains
guidelines of general application (I.R.M. 4.10.3 (2003)) as well as separate guidelines for the
examination of individual, corporate, partnership, estate, and employment tax returns. Further,
directives on particular issues are developed at various levels of the Service, in particular through
the Service's Coordinated Examination Program for large corporate taxpayers and through its
Industry Specialization Program for specific industries. See generally SALTZMAN, supra note 76, at
§ 8.07; James E. Merritt, Administrative Procedures: Large Case Audits; Industry Specialization
Program; Coordinated Examination Program ("CEP'), in HOW TO HANDLE A TAx CONTROVERSY
AT THE IRS AND IN COURT 63, 87-88 (ALI-ABA Course of Study 1997), available at SC24 ALI-
ABA 63 (Westlaw).
81. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
82. Ronald Stein, Settling With The IRS: The Importance of Procedure, 107 TAX NOTES
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convinced of the strength of a taxpayer's position, then the agent will
typically not raise it despite some potential that the Service might
succeed if the issue were litigated.83 Further, even though examining
agents lack the formal authority to settle issues, they often engage in
informal settlements by issue swapping.84 Consequently, this practical
reality must be reflected in the position guidelines adopted for the
institution.
Finally, even once clear standards are developed and their
application to different controversy functions determined, the problem of
lowest denominator decision making must be faced. The institutional
reality is that no Service employee acts in isolation regarding significant
decisions. When any particular employee evaluates an issue under the
relevant position standard, their decision most likely will be reviewed by
a number of supervising employees with increasing authority. As a
practical matter, only if all these reviewers agree regarding the strength
of the Service's position and the appropriate application of the relevant
position guidelines will the Service ultimately pursue an issue.85 As a
result, the ultimate institutional decision typically reflects the view of the
employee having the lowest assessment of the strength of the Service's
position and the strictest view of the application of the controversy
position guidelines to that issue.86 Consequently, this lowest assessment
1675, 1676 (2005) (Even though barred from considering the hazards of litigation, "in practice, the
agent may choose to forego potential issues in recognition of concessions by the taxpayer .... ).
83. Thomas D. Terry, ABA Committee Submits Comments on Expansion of IRS Examination
Division Settlement Authority, TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 6, 1995, LEXIS 95 TNT 67-44 ("Further,
the normal discretion that Exam exercises in the audit process necessarily carries with it some
latitude related to settlement authority. Thus, by deciding which issues to raise, Exam implicitly
concedes others.").
84. Since an agent cannot settle an issue based on the hazards of litigation, there is no
justification or ability to effect split dollar settlements where the taxpayer agrees to pay a percentage
of the total alleged tax deficiency based on the Service's chance of success on the issue. However,
agents frequently will achieve a similar settlement effect by agreeing with the taxpayer to not raise
one issue in exchange for the taxpayer's agreement to concede liability on a different issue. This
type of issue trading is often used by agents to avoid the need for detailed factual development on
the conceded issue. As a practical matter, such issue trading occurs frequently, although agents are
specifically instructed not to raise an issue merely for the purpose of trading it away. Rev. Proc. 64-
22, 1964-1 C.B. 689.
85. That is, if any employee decides the issue is not a meritorious one, the likely result is that
the Service will concede the issue. The reality is that decisions to pursue issues are the most likely
ones to be passed on to the next level for review.
86. This would not be the case if the Service were less hierarchical in its structure. In many
instances, an argument can be made that group or institutional decisions tend to be more extreme
than that ofjudgment of the individuals contributing to the decision ("Groupthink"). Groupthink is
"a mode of thinking that people engage in when they are deeply involved in a cohesive in-group,
when the members' strivings for unanimity override their motivation to realistically appraise
alternative courses of action." Irving L. Janis, VICTIMS OF GROUPTHINK: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
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bias must also be factored into crafting any controversy position
guidelines for the Service.
D. Evaluating a Position's Strength
The primary function of any controversy guideline is to determine
whether or not a legal issue should be pursued. While, as discussed
above, there may be situations where the disposition of an issue is
ultimately controlled by overriding policy concerns, in all cases a key
factor in deciding to pursue an issue is the perceived strength of the
Service's legal position. While evaluating the strength of any legal
position is more akin to a skill than a mathematical science, some system
of measurement still must be used to quantify the relative strength or
weakness of a legal position.
As discussed above, in appraising the merits of an issue from the
taxpayer's standpoint, a continuum of catch phrases has developed to
gauge a position's strength.87 While the authorities from which these
terms are derived typically do not assign percentage probabilities to
them, in practice the tax bar does. Under that scale the relevant
thresholds and approximate associated probabilities (from least to most
likely) are: frivolous (10% or less), reasonable basis (at least 20%),
realistic possibility of success (at least 33%), substantial authority (at
least 40%), more likely than not (more than 50%), should (at least
66.7%), and will (at least 80%).88
The use of percentage probabilities to assess the merits of a legal
issue can be criticized on the ground that it is misleading to use
percentage probabilities since they imply exactitude in an assessment
that actually represents only a general expectation regarding the
outcome. 89 A conclusion regarding the legal strength of a position
represents a reasoned and considered judgment rather than a
mathematical certainty.90 Since it is based in no small measure on the
experience and knowledge of the appraiser, assigning a specific
percentage probability to such an assessment arguably misleads the
STUDY OF FOREIGN-POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES 9 (1972). However, groupthink is typically a
problem only in small, cohesive groups of decision-makers where relieving tensions and creating
cohesion within the group overrides deliberative decision making. Indeed in such groups the most
extreme positions may be adopted as the members with such views are more likely to forcefully
present them and leave the other decision-makers with the impression that everyone else must be in
agreement given the lack of criticism voiced in the group deliberations.
87. See discussion supra Part II.A.
88. See discussion supra Part II.A.
89. See supra note 19.
90. See supra note 19.
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client regarding the underlying basis and actual certitude of the
appraisal.
However, this criticism misperceives the rationale for using
percentage probabilities to quantify the chances of various outcomes in a
legal analysis. Such percentages are really just used as an easily grasped
shorthand to identify the basic probability plateaus intended by the
verbal formulations. Phrased differently, practitioners using such
percentages do not believe, or mean to imply, that they are in fact
absolute and precise strength assessments. In reality practitioners do not
come up with a percentage assessment of say 49% and conclude that
therefore the issue fails to meet the more likely than not standard.
Rather, they undertake their reasoned appraisal of whether the taxpayer
will succeed and then use the percentages as a short hand to succinctly
convey that assessment to others. Viewed in this light, it makes little
difference whether words or percentages are used to express these
probability assessments.
Consequently, this article will use a percentage probability
formulation as the relevant metric for the controversy guidelines
proposed in Part IV. Using such percentages has several benefits. First,
as discussed above, percentages are easy to grasp intuitively and less
cumbersome than a verbal formulation. Second, using percentage
guidelines provides a common base of understanding between Service
employees and tax practitioners since practitioners routinely evaluate a
client's legal issues by assigning such percentage probabilities to various
outcomes. 9' And third, using percentage evaluations reflects the reality
that such percentages are often used in gauging the appropriateness of a
settlement proposal.
However, even once an acceptable metric is agreed upon,
reasonable persons will often reach divergent appraisals regarding the
strength of a position in any given situation. Differences in evaluations
can arise from variations in the experience and training of the evaluators
as well as from divergent perceptions of the relevant facts and the
meaning of the relevant law. In order for a set of controversy position
standards to have their desired impact in an institutional setting, the
institution must take steps to minimize such divergent appraisals. The
goal is not to create rigid interpretive rules that are strictly enforced, but
rather to foster an interpretive community where, on the same facts,
most reviewers would reach essentially the same conclusion regarding
91. This commonality in approach also is beneficial since it is not uncommon for practitioners
to leave private practice for positions at the Service and vice versa.
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the strength of the Service's position based on their common training
and analytical approach. Consequently, a key part of any system of
controversy guidance must be a setting forth of a clear framework for
analysis and providing the necessary training of employees to promote
uniformity in results.
IV. CRAFTING NEW STANDARDS FOR GOVERNMENT POSITIONS
In light of the foregoing considerations relevant to developing an
effective controversy paradigm for the Service, this Part will present a
set of proposed controversy guidelines that address the noted
considerations.
A. The Proposed Controversy Guidelines
As discussed above, a taxpayer can legitimately take a non-
frivolous position in litigation (or a disclosed reasonable basis position
on a tax return) even if the taxpayer does not actually believe his
position should be upheld.92  While reasonable arguments exist
supporting such a taxpayer right,93 the basic premise of the controversy
guidelines proposed here is that the Service generally should not assert
claims it does not believe will be upheld.94 More precisely, the Service
should only pursue issues when the Service's position reaches the
correct tax policy result and has a significant chance of prevailing in
litigation. Thus, the Service should be held to a significantly higher
standard in controversy matters than would apply to a taxpayer. The
remainder of this Part IV.A. explains the proposed controversy
guidelines in more detail. The goals and operation of the proposed
approach is further discussed in Part IV.B., infra.
1. General Controversy Guidelines
The proposed controversy guidelines take a two step approach.
First, the Service would determine the correct tax policy answer for any
92. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
93. The primary argument for allowing a taxpayer to file a tax return based on a less than
certain position is that the taxpayer should be able to litigate uncertainties in the law prior to
actually paying the uncertain tax liability. See, e.g., BERNARD WOLFMAN, JAMES P. HOLDEN &
KENNETH L. HARRIS, STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE § 202.2 (6th ed. 2004).
94. As discussed above, the Service is not a monolith. It operates only through its employees.
However, for purposes of setting forth the general goals those employees should be striving for on
behalf of their institution, this Part will generally phrase the proposed controversy guidelines in
terms of rules to which the Service should adhere.
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issue presented (the "Policy Threshold"). If, and only if, the relevant tax
policy considerations support pursuing the issue, would the actual
probability of success in litigation be considered to determine if it meets
the minimum level set forth in the guidelines for pursuing the matter (the
"Probability Threshold"). Absent unusual circumstances, the Service
would only pursue issues satisfying both thresholds and would
completely concede all other issues.
Satisfying the Policy Threshold requires a determination that the
Service's asserted position on a contested issue represents the correct tax
policy. In this context the "correct" tax policy means a determination by
the Service that their position reaches the proper result from the vantage
point of fostering a fair tax system and furthering sound tax
administration. 95 The goal of the Policy Threshold is to force the
Service to analyze each situation and truly conclude that pursuing the
matter is in the best interests of the tax system as a whole. This is a
multi-faceted analysis examining issues of fairness, equity, uniformity,
tax theory, and tax administration in addition to the potential tax revenue
impact. In this context, the Service should evaluate the Policy Threshold
in light of the policy and purpose behind the relevant statutory
provisions even if a court might refuse to consider such authorities.96
It is important to note that the Policy Threshold determination is
made without reference to the actual likelihood of success in litigation.
Thus, even if the Service would have a very high probability of success
(say greater than 80%) if it were to pursue an issue, the issue should not
be pursued if doing so would be counter to sound tax policy.97  Of
course, the Service's view of sound tax policy must be informed by
Congressional views and in the case of a direct conflict, the
Congressional determination would need to control. For instance, if
Congress were to adopt a tax provision to address a specific situation,
then the Service would not be permitted to avoid enforcing that statute
against taxpayers in such situation on the ground that pursuing the issue
would be contrary to sound tax policy since the Congressional adoption
of the statute has conclusively fixed the proper tax policy in that
instance. However, assume that the same statute, if read literally, would
also apply to a situation apparently not considered by Congress. Here,
the Service should be permitted to forego enforcing the literal words of
95. See discussion supra Part II1.A.
96. Even if one accepts the premise that the judiciary should not "make law," an
administrative agency is not as fully subject to such prohibition. See supra note 70.
97. Conversely, this threshold could be satisfied even if the Service had almost no chance of
successfully pursuing its position in litigation.
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the statutory provision if it determines that doing so is in the best
interests of the tax system as a whole. 98
If the Service concludes that the Policy Threshold is not met, then
the issue should be conceded by the Service. If the Policy Threshold is
satisfied, then the Service must examine the Probability Threshold to
determine whether, despite being on the tax policy high ground, the
contested issue nevertheless should be settled with the taxpayer or
dropped, rather than being asserted against the taxpayer and eventually
litigated.99 Depending on the percentage probability of success on the
merits, one of four results would be obtained under the Probability
Threshold Guidelines. (1) If the Service has an 80% or greater
probability of success (the "80% Threshold"), then the Service would
always continue to pursue the issue if the taxpayer refused to completely
concede the issue. (2) If the Service has a greater than 50% (but less
than 80%) probability of success (the "50% Threshold"), the Service
should attempt to reach a fair °0 settlement of the issue with the taxpayer,
but would assert a deficiency and ultimately litigate the matter if no
settlement is reached. (3) If the Service's probability of success is
between 33% and 50% (the "Gray Zone Threshold"), then the Service
should attempt to reach a settlement with the taxpayer that yields the
Service at least 50% of the tax liability at stake in the issue. If such a
settlement cannot be reached, then the Service must decide either to
entirely concede the issue or to assert the full deficiency against the
taxpayer and ultimately proceed to litigation. The decision to concede or
proceed would be based on an analysis of all relevant considerations,
including, the tax policies involved, the actual percentage probability of
98. Whether the Service has such power can well be debated. See, e.g., Gregg D. Polsky, Can
Treasury Overrule the Supreme Court?, 84 B.U. L. REv. 185 (2004) (arguing that the Service's
"check the box" regulations for entity classification, while a great aid to taxpayers and tax
administration, are nevertheless invalid since not supported by the statute as previously interpreted
by the Supreme Court).
99. As a procedural matter, it is the taxpayer that typically decides whether or not an issue
will be litigated in civil tax cases. If the Service and the taxpayer fail to reach agreement on an
issue raised by the Service, the Service can either concede the issue or, more typically, assert that
the taxpayer has underpaid his tax liability as a result and demand immediate payment. At that
juncture the taxpayer can either petition the Tax Court to review the issue or pay the asserted tax
liability and subsequently sue the government for a refund of the amount paid in the federal district
courts or the court of federal claims. However, while the taxpayer technically commences the
litigation, a decision by the Service to continue asserting a position after settlement negotiations
with the taxpayer have failed generally ensures that the matter will be raised by the taxpayer in
litigation.
100. Typically a fair settlement would be one roughly in accord with the Service's perception
of the strength of its position, but in no event would a concession of more than half the proposed
deficiency amount of the issue be considered fair under the proposed guidelines.
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success, the underlying equities of the case, the dollar amount of the tax
liability at issue, the cost of litigating the case, and the potential harm to
the tax system that would result from an adverse judicial determination
on the issue. It is expected that a substantial number of cases in this
category would in fact be dropped by the Service as a result of this facts
and circumstances review. (4) If the Service's probability of success is
less than 33% (the "33% Threshold"), then the Service would concede
the issue despite the fact that the Policy Threshold was satisfied.
2. Institutional Adjustments
As discussed above, any set of controversy position standards must
be tailored to fit their institutional context. A crucial purpose of the
proposed controversy guidelines is to promote both the perception and
the reality of the Service as an impartial guardian of the tax laws charged
with working with taxpayers to ensure a fair tax system. To facilitate
this goal, all members of the institution must act accordingly.
Consequently, the proposed guidelines need to be disseminated and
explained throughout the Service. Stressing the institution's
commitment to the proposed guidelines will help employees internalize
this overall goal and prevent them from treating taxpayers as adversaries
intent on attacking the fisc. In this way, the proposed controversy
guidelines are intended to act as a type of moral compass guiding
employees in their everyday activities whenever they find themselves
unsure of what action should be taken in a particular situation.
Beyond making the proposed controversy guidelines generally
known to all Service employees, the guidelines must be adapted to
account for differences in the functional roles of Service employees. In
this regard, the proposed guidelines would generally retain the
traditional limitation on the settlement authority of examining agents and
leave the existing rules regarding internal operations unchanged.
However, under the proposed guidelines, examining agents would not be
charged with applying the Policy Threshold. Instead, examination
personnel would focus on making factual determinations and making the
initial Probability Threshold review. The role of the examining agent
would be to assert any issue with a probability of success greater than
33%, unless other Service directives identified the issue as one for which
the Policy Threshold would not be met. Such identified issues would
not be settled by the examining agent, and would either be agreed to by
the taxpayer or protested to the Appeals Division for further
consideration and possible settlement at that level. Issues with a
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probability of success below 33% would be conceded conclusively at the
examination level.
With regard to issue swapping as an informal means of settlement
at the examination level, the proposed guidelines would accept that,
while examining agents are not generally charged with settlement
authority, trading issues often constitutes the most efficient means of
satisfactorily resolving controversies with taxpayers. Examining agents
typically have the best perspective on weighing factual and proof issues
presented in a taxpayer's return. Consequently, issue trading based on
the examining agent's weighing of such factual matters is appropriate.
Issue trading based on legal uncertainties is less optimal and generally
should not be undertaken by examining agents. The greatest temptation
to issue swap legal issues will be on matters that the examining agent
believes have little merit and is willing to concede to obtain immediate
agreement on another issue where the agent feels the case is strong. An
examining agent would generally be less willing to trade away one issue
for agreement on another when he believes the Service has a substantial
chance to succeed on both issues if litigated. Consequently, as a
practical matter, the creation of the 33% Threshold and the 80%
Threshold should serve to dramatically decrease the number of legal
issues on which an agent is willing to even consider issue swapping. In
those instances where an examining agent nevertheless does engage in
issue swapping based on legal uncertainty, the agent should keep the
general intent of the proposed guidelines in mind, including making an
evaluation of the Policy Threshold (which would normally not be
invoked in examination determinations) since it is unlikely that the
policy considerations of such swapped issues will become subject to
consideration by the Appeals Division.
B. Goals of the Proposed Controversy Guidelines
The central requirement for any set of Service controversy position
standards is that they promote compliance with the self-assessment
system by demonstrating to taxpayers that the Service is aggressively
pursing tax cheats without overreaching in ordinary cases. The proposed
position guidelines attempt to promote this perception and reality in
several ways. First, the Policy Threshold ensures that the Service will
not assert claims that it does not truly believe are appropriate from a tax
policy and administration standpoint. While the Service is permitted
under the proposed guidelines to raise issues even if its chances of
success on the merits are as low as 33%, such Gray Zone issues are only
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pursued if the Service believes the entire tax system benefits from
pursuing the issue. 01 Additionally, with respect to issues falling within
the Gray Zone Threshold, reasonable minds could differ regarding the
proper appraisal of the strength of the issue. Therefore, allowing the
Service to pursue Gray Zone issues helps hedge against the Service's
institutional tendency to appraise the merits of issues more
restrictively.'0 2 For both these reasons, taxpayers should gain faith that
the Service is acting rationally to enforce the tax law in the interests of
the entire tax system when it pursues issues on audit.
Another key goal of the proposed guidelines is to promote the fair
and efficient resolution of tax controversies. The Probability Thresholds
promote this goal in several ways. These Thresholds help narrow the
real issues for discussion by eliminating debate about controversies at
each end of the probability spectrum. The 33% Threshold frees the
taxpayer from having to defend against claims on which the taxpayer's
claim is quite likely to be sustained under the currently applicable law.
Similarly, the 80% Threshold dissuades taxpayers from asserting
extreme positions to obtain nuisance settlements from the Service. Since
extreme positions on both sides are dissuaded by the proposed
controversy guidelines, the Service and taxpayers can focus more effort
on evaluating and addressing issues where legitimate uncertainty exists
regarding the proper resolution of an issue.
Further, the Gray Zone Threshold operates to force both taxpayers
and the Service to honestly evaluate their probability of success in
litigation (as well as other considerations) when weighing their
settlement options. It is fairly common for tax practitioners to
overestimate their chance of success on the merits. 0 3  An overly
optimistic appraisal, even if employed as a mere negotiating technique
with a less optimistic assessment provided confidentially to the client,
may create unrealistic client expectations and impede settlement. Under
the proposed controversy guidelines, the Service would not accept any
101. While an examining agent will raise Gray Zone issues without first examining the Policy
Threshold, the taxpayer always has the ability to protest such issues to the Appeals Division where
the Policy Threshold will be considered. Consequently, any taxpayer who feels the Service is
inappropriately pursing an issue will be afforded the full benefit of both the Policy and Probability
Thresholds. Conversely, if a taxpayer agrees with the deficiency determined by the examining
agent without resorting to Appeals consideration, then it strongly implies that the Service's
assessment of the issue as being in the Gray Zone was inaccurately low in any event.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
103. See Elizabeth F. Loftus & William A. Wagenaar, Lawyers' Predictions of Success, 28
JURIMETRICS J. 437, 437 (1988) (finding that "in general lawyers were overconfident in their
chances of winning, especially so in cases in which they had been highly confident to begin with").
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settlement less than 50% on the theory that the Service believes its
position is the correct one from a policy viewpoint even if its chances of
succeeding in court might be somewhat lower. If a 50% settlement
cannot be reached, then the Service has to decide, based on all the facts
and circumstances, whether to concede the issue or to proceed with
asserting the tax deficiency and ultimately litigate the matter.
This combination of a percentage settlement coupled with the
uncertainty of an all or nothing consequence upon rejection presents
taxpayers (and their advisors) with a complex decision. If a taxpayer is
wrong in its appraisal of its chances, then the Service may be forced into
an all or nothing choice that may ultimately prove detrimental to the
taxpayer. Similarly, taxpayers with perceived chances within the range
of reasonable doubt around the 50% level will be more likely to
acquiesce to a 50% settlement offer since it will be clear that that is the
best result obtainable short of litigation. Consequently, while making
any settlement decision requires an understanding of the merits of the
case, the downside for miscalculation is increased when the Service's
options below a 50/50 settlement are limited to a simple proceed or
concede decision. This encourages taxpayers to be very honest with
themselves in appraising their actual chances of success on the merits
and promotes the acceptance of any settlement within the reasonable
range of appropriate compromises.
An example will help illustrate the dynamic. Assume a taxpayer
initially believes her position has a 60% chance of success if litigated
(i.e., she believes the Service has only a 40% chance). In a normal
negotiating strategy the taxpayer might first assert that a 75/25 split
settlement would be appropriate in hopes of reaching an ultimate
settlement of 60/40 or better. The only downside to such a strategy is
the risk that the Service would conclude from the initial offer that there
was simply no middle ground on which to negotiate. Under the
proposed guidelines, since the Service's chances exceed the 33%
Threshold, the taxpayer knows that the Service will not automatically
concede this issue. The taxpayer also knows that the Service cannot
accept a 40% settlement. The taxpayer's choice is to accept a 50%
settlement or to reject it in the belief that the Service ultimately will
either (1) concede the issue based on a facts and circumstances review or
(2) lose in litigation. In a close case, a taxpayer will probably discount
the likelihood of the Service conceding the issue since the Service will
have a substantial chance of success and will already have determined
that their position is appropriate from a policy standpoint (i.e.,
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determined that the Policy Threshold is satisfied). 10 4  Therefore, the
taxpayer must closely consider whether the theoretical 10% "loss" from
accepting a 50% settlement warrants taking the risk of obtaining nothing
in a potentially costly litigation. 10 5  Thus, in situations where a 50%
settlement is in the range of potentially acceptable ones, taxpayers will
be encouraged to more readily accept settlements at the lower end of
their settlement range. A rational taxpayer should only reject a 50/50
settlement if such settlement is truly outside of its acceptable settlement
range. As an added advantage, the rejection of such a settlement offer
will prompt the Service to honestly reevaluate its own appraisal of the
merits since the taxpayer's insistence on the strength of their position
has real consequences and is no longer just posturing as part of their
negotiating strategy.
C. Anticipating Certain Criticisms of the Proposed Controversy
Guidelines
While the proposed controversy guidelines are intended to facilitate
the fair enforcement and sound administration of the tax system, it is
likely that any number of criticisms could be raised regarding particular
aspects of the proposed guidelines. Many of these will represent
divergent policy approaches rather than frailties with the proposed
guidelines per se. For instance, the 33% Threshold could be challenged
as being too generous to taxpayers since it prevents the Service from
litigating a matter even when the Policy Threshold has been met. The
33% Threshold is justifiable if one believes that there should be a level
where, even though legitimate arguments could be made for the
Service's position in court, the Service should be forced to pursue their
tax policy goal by seeking legislative change rather than asserting a
strained interpretation of the existing law. However, not all would
agree.
Other criticisms may fall into the category of attacking the
proposed guidelines as generally unworkable for various reasons. So,
104. This is especially true because the taxpayer will realize that reasonable minds can differ
regarding the merits of an issue. So, while the taxpayer's view is that the Service only has a 40%
chance of success, the taxpayer must realize that the Service could view itself as still having a more
than 50% chance on the merits, in which case from the Service's perception of the case would fall
into the 50% Threshold (rather than the Gray Zone Threshold) and would never concede the case if
no settlement is reached.
105. While there is a chance that the Service might concede the issue if the settlement is
rejected, a taxpayer in a case fairly close to the 50% line would typically assume that the Service
would continue to contest the issue given its fairly strong position.
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some may assert that the proposed guidelines are (1) too vague given
their reference to percentage probabilities that are often guesswork, or
conversely (2) too rigid given their reference to specific percentages
probabilities, or perhaps just (3) too simplistic given the reality of a large
institution and the myriad situations to which the guidelines must be
applied. Such arguments miss the point of this article. As discussed
above, any set of controversy position standards must use some metric
for measuring a position's strength. 10 6  The specific percentage
probabilities used in this article could be substituted for another
formulation expressing such relative strengths. Further, the proposed
controversy guidelines are neither inflexible precepts written on stone
tablets, nor are they intended to replace all existing internal operating
procedures. The goal of this piece is not to replace the thousands of
pages of internal directives and employee guidelines already adopted by
the Service, but rather to suggest that the Service should have some
overall guidelines that would imbue a "guiding spirit" into those existing
directives. Further, the proposed guidelines are just that, guidelines. It
is expected that in appropriate circumstances the Service should and
would violate a guideline if it was determined to be in the best interests
of the tax system. For instance, the National Office could identify a
specific issue where a test case was desired and instruct the Examination
Division to consult with it whenever that issue presents itself regardless
of the examining agent's perception of the various Thresholds.
Finally, the proposed guidelines could be criticized as a usurpation
of Congress's legislative power. As discussed above, a fierce debate
exists regarding the proper approach to statutory interpretation."'
Similarly, reasonable minds differ regarding the scope of quasi-
legislative actions by administrative agencies. 108  Consequently, the
appropriateness of using the Policy Threshold (which sanctions an all
inclusive approach to statutory interpretation as well as a large role for
the Service in independently developing tax policy through its
enforcement activity) could be reasonably debated and those whose
beliefs tend toward strictly textual statutory construction would likely
have serious concerns regarding the proposed controversy guidelines.
Again, this is not a problem with the proposed controversy guidelines
per se, but a reflection of broader issues relating to the scope of
legislative power that should be granted to administrative agencies.
106. See discussion supra Part III.D.
107. See supra notes 65 & 66.
108. See supra notes 70& 71.
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V. CONCLUSION
Creating fair enforcement policies is a key element in maintaining
an equitable and efficient tax system. Unfortunately, the standards by
which the Service weighs its enforcement activity have never been
clearly articulated. This article has proposed a set of controversy
guidelines aimed at rationalizing the Service's enforcement decisions
and promoting taxpayer faith that the Service is dedicated to enforcing
the tax laws in the best interests of all taxpayers without unwarranted
over-reaching in its normal audit activities. The proposed guidelines are
intended as a basic framework to guide the actions of all Service
employees and promote less adversarial relations between taxpayers and
the Service. Given the current uncertainty regarding the appropriate
Service position standards, it is hoped that the Service will consider the
issues discussed in this article and adopt a formalized set of controversy
guidelines in the near future.
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